Kash’s draft “The Next 2 Years: DAO Resolution Pt.1” attempts to chart a course for Jupiter DAO’s future. It lays out high-level principles about purpose, independence, and funding. While the intent to strengthen the DAO is welcome, the proposal is ultimately heavy on philosophy and light on concrete empowerment. It fails to truly empower the DAO, provides no meaningful new utility for the $JUP token, and stops short of granting tangible autonomy to the community. In its current form, the draft frames the DAO as a supportive engine for the core team’s goals rather than a governing force in its own right. This response will expose those weaknesses and propose a counter-resolution with actionable changes to put Jupiter DAO on a path to genuine self-governance and $JUP value accrual.
DAO Lacks True Power Under the Draft
The draft acknowledges the need for DAO independence, but then delays it for two years. It speaks of “progressive independence” by May 1, 2027, with the Jupiter team guiding the DAO until then. In other words, the community is asked to wait patiently while remaining under the team’s wing. This is more like a probation period than empowerment. Crucially, key levers of power remain with the team – the document explicitly states that “tokenomics or product strategy… remain under the Jupiter Team’s control.” So the DAO is denied authority over core aspects of the ecosystem. Even the treasury is only partially in the DAO’s hands: the largest pool of funds (the Litterbox Trust) won’t be accessible until 2027(if ever). For the next two years, the DAO must rely on whatever the team allocates (a topped-up $10M USDC treasury) while the much larger trust fund sits idle under third-party management. This structure indicates a fundamental lack of trust in the DAO’s capability to govern now. How can the DAO be treated as a serious governing body if it doesn’t control the ecosystem’s finances or economic policy today? Deferring real autonomy undermines the very idea of decentralized governance.
Furthermore, the “legislative arm” framing rings hollow when the community’s legislation cannot touch critical domains. The DAO can pass proposals, but only within a sandbox defined by the team. The draft positions the DAO to focus on community initiatives and growth efforts, but not to govern the protocol holistically. True empowerment means the community would have final say on how resources are used and how the project evolves. Instead, the DAO is being kept as an advisory and fundraising committee under the supervision of the team. This imbalance needs to be corrected immediately, not two years from now.
Excess Philosophy, Minimal Substance
One of the most striking aspects of the draft is its abundance of high-level philosophy and principles with few tangible changes enacted. It is full of WHEREAS clauses about lessons learned and ambitious goals, but when it comes to actual mandates, they are either continuations of the status quo or vague intentions. For example, the resolution emphasizes ecosystem expansion, community participation, and global promotion of Jupiter’s ideas. These are noble aims, but they are not new or specific – the DAO was always meant to do those things. Meanwhile, pressing practical issues are punted to future efforts.
The draft “RESOLVED” to reform governance mechanics and mentions ideas like streamlined budgeting, better proposal pathways, and enhanced staking rewards. However, it does not implement any of these now – it only states that the DAO shall reform these in the future. This is essentially a promise of maybe doing something later, without committing to a single concrete improvement today. Long-term $JUP holders and active community members have heard plenty of visionary talk; what’s lacking is action.
After one year of the DAO, members expected more than just a rehash of broad goals. They expected structural changes that address known pain points (like cumbersome voting or lack of incentives). Instead, the draft formalizes a lot of what we already have and kicks the can down the road on the rest.
This overemphasis on vision without substance comes at a cost: community confidence. A DAO resolution ought to resolve things – to make decisions or change course. But this draft leaves the community with essentially the same powers and the same ambiguities as before, just wrapped in inspiring language. It feels like a pat on the back (“keep expanding the ecosystem, we’ll help you for two years, trust us”) rather than a bold shift. The community doesn’t need more platitudes about “maturing into a self-sufficient entity” – it needs a plan of action to get there. We should be wary of accepting a feel-good roadmap that lacks the hard guarantees and details that long-term participants deserve.
$JUP Token: Still No Meaningful Utility
Perhaps the most glaring omission in the draft is any meaningful utility or value accrual for the $JUP token. The document explicitly de-prioritizes tokenomics in the DAO’s focus. While it’s understandable that product adoption is a priority, ignoring token utility is short-sighted.
$JUP is the lifeblood of the DAO – it’s not only a governance token but also a representation of the community’s stake in Jupiter’s success. After a year, token holders have seen precious little in terms of benefits for holding and staking $JUP. Governance rights alone (which themselves are limited, as discussed) are a thin value proposition, especially when major decisions are deferred or outside the DAO’s scope.
The draft hints at establishing $JUP as a community currency and enhancing Active Staking Rewards (ASR), but provides no specifics or immediate initiatives. This vague promise does not equate to utility. What new use cases for $JUP are being introduced? None are concretely described. Long-term holders are essentially told to wait and hope that eventually $JUP will become more widely used. Meanwhile, the current reality is that $JUP’s utility remains minimal: it is used to stake for voting (and possibly to earn some inflationary reward via ASR), but it doesn’t entitle holders to any share of Jupiter’s revenues or give them perks in the ecosystem today.
This is a serious problem. Without clear utility or rewards, why should new participants buy and hold $JUP? The draft’s answer is, implicitly, faith in future ecosystem growth. But faith alone won’t sustain token value. Other successful crypto ecosystems have recognized that you must align incentives by giving token holders a tangible piece of the action. For instance, many protocols implement fee-sharing, discounts, or exclusive features for their token stakers. Jupiter’s own community has repeatedly voiced interest in such models – recall that 50% of protocol fees are already being diverted to the Litterbox Trust to buy $JUP, a move “heavily requested by the community”. This shows that stakeholders want the token to accrue value from platform usage. However, under the current setup, those purchased tokens just accumulate in a silo, doing nothing for holders today. It’s an indirect benefit at best (perhaps supporting the token price floor), but it’s not the same as holders receiving value or utility directly.
In fact, the prevailing attitude from the team has been to keep protocol revenue usage out of the DAO’s hands, and by extension, away from providing immediate token rewards. Kash himself noted that the team intends to “maintain control of operating fees” and decisions about those fees are outside the DAO’s remit.
The rationale given is that the team built the product and knows best how to use the revenue for the long-term benefit of the ecosystem.
From a token holder’s perspective, this stance is disappointing – it signals that $JUP holders won’t see direct economic benefits, and must simply trust the team to eventually funnel value to them (perhaps via that trust fund in 2027). This top-down control of revenue is antithetical to the ethos of a DAO. It also leaves the $JUP token in a precarious position: if the market loses confidence that real value will flow to $JUP, demand for the token could dry up, harming the very ecosystem growth the team wants to prioritize. Token utility and ecosystem growth are not mutually exclusive – in fact, they reinforce each other. A token with strong utility attracts more participants, which drives ecosystem usage and aligns the community’s interests with the platform’s success. The draft’s neglect of this principle is a major weakness that must be addressed.
A DAO That Serves, Not Governs
The current draft, at its core, envisions a DAO that serves as a “supportive engine” for Jupiter, rather than a sovereign governing force. It defines the DAO’s purpose as accelerating Jupiter’s product adoption and spreading Jupiter’s product adoption and spreading Jupiter’s ideas. In practice, this casts the DAO in the role of a marketing and community growth department. There is nothing inherently wrong with wanting the community to evangelize and build on Jupiter’s platform – indeed that should be part of the DAO’s mission. But if that’s all the DAO is, then we are falling short of true decentralization. The DAO should be the governing body of the ecosystem, not just an auxiliary support group.
Under the current draft’s vision, the DAO is still fundamentally following the Jupiter team’s lead. The team will “assist” the DAO for two years, provide funding for the treasury (with strings attached), retain control of core matters, and “collaborate” with the DAO to implement mandates. These mandates themselves primarily focus on supporting ecosystem expansion rather than steering it. In short, the DAO is being treated like a junior partner. It receives some responsibility—mainly around handling grants and community initiatives—but remains subordinate in critical decisions. This dynamic is clear from the proposal’s wording and even more evident from the underlying assumptions.
This “supportive engine” framing is problematic. It may be acceptable during the earliest stages of a DAO’s life when the community is newly organizing and heavily reliant on the team’s guidance. However, Jupiter DAO is now a year old and is recognized as one of the most active DAOs in crypto. The community has proven its commitment and capability. Continuing to confine the DAO to a supportive, assistive role risks demotivating engaged members and stunting the DAO’s evolution. If the DAO cannot set its own agenda or control its destiny until some arbitrary future date, we must ask: Is it truly decentralized, or is it merely a façade for a centralized system that only promises future decentralization?
We should critically examine the endgame as well: even when May 2027 arrives, will the team truly hand over the reins, or will there be another phased plan? The draft only states that the DAO will gain access to the trust funds by then — it does not mention yielding control over product development or tokenomics. In other words, the DAO might receive a large sum of money in 2027, but still have no say in how the protocol operates or how new revenues are allocated. That would still leave it as a well-funded support organization, not a true governing entity.
The community must push back now against the notion that the DAO’s highest role is to “accelerate Jupiter’s ideas” while the core team retains actual control. The DAO can — and should — be a governing force: setting policies, controlling treasury outflows, and yes, even influencing protocol economics. It should do this in partnership with the team, but not at the team’s mercy.
A Counter-Resolution: Concrete Steps for Empowerment
It’s not enough to critique the existing plan; we need a constructive path forward. Below is a proposed counter-resolution that addresses the draft’s shortcomings by introducing actionable changes. These measures aim to genuinely empower the DAO, give $JUP holders real utility, and shift the DAO from a support role to a governing role in the Jupiter ecosystem:
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Immediate DAO Control of the Litterbox Trust & Treasury: Convert the Litterbox Trust into a DAO-controlled treasury effective immediately, and remove any time-based restrictions on its use. The funds and $JUP accumulated in that trust should fall under the direct stewardship of Jupiter DAO with indefinite duration – essentially becoming part of the community treasury that isn’t set to expire or automatically disburse by a deadline. This means no waiting until 2027 to unlock those resources. By handing over the keys now, the team demonstrates true confidence in the community’s ability to govern. It also ensures the DAO has the war chest it needs to fund long-term projects and weather downturns. The DAO Treasury (including what was the Litterbox Trust) would thus be controlled by on-chain governance votes, and could support initiatives beyond just what fits in a two-year window.
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DAO Voters as the Sole Authority on Spending: Establish clearly that DAO token holders (voting with their $JUP stake) are the only ones who decide how DAO funds are spent. Neither the core team nor any trust administrator should override or pre-approve spending decisions. Every allocation from the treasury – whether it’s a grant, an investment, or an operational expense – must be approved by a DAO vote or through whatever decentralized processes the DAO sets up (e.g. delegated budgets to elected work groups, if the community chooses that). This change would formalize the DAO as the governing force over its finances, eliminating ambiguity. The team’s role in funding would shift to one of enabler (contributing funds, as they’ve pledged) without strings attached. If the team commits $10M USDC, that money enters the DAO’s control and from there on, the community decides how to deploy it for growth. Making this the rule would prevent scenarios where, for example, revenue streams are unilaterally diverted or spending is vetoed by anyone outside the token-holder governance. In short: the community’s vote is final on financial matters.
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Staking-Based Utility for $JUP (Fee Discounts, Rewards, Real Yield): It’s time to give $JUP holders tangible benefits that align with Jupiter’s success. The counter-resolution should introduce features such as:
- Platform Fee Discounts: Users who stake $JUP should receive discounted fees when using Jupiter’s platform (e.g. trades on the DEX aggregator). This creates an immediate reason for traders to acquire and hold $JUP – the more you use Jupiter, the more it makes sense to be a token holder. It effectively makes $JUP a “membership token” that reduces costs, driving both token demand and platform volume.
- Trading Mining & Incentives: The DAO can allocate some of its treasury (or a portion of fees) to reward activity that benefits the ecosystem. For instance, traders or liquidity providers could earn $JUP rebates or rewards for hitting certain volume milestones or participating in campaigns. If implemented smartly, this could increase Jupiter’s market share while distributing $JUP to engaged users (who are likely to become new DAO members). Crucially, the DAO should design these programs so that long-term stakers get extra perks – e.g. only those staking $JUP for a minimum period qualify for certain premium rewards.
- Real Yield for Stakers: Perhaps most importantly, introduce a mechanism for sharing protocol revenue with $JUP stakers. Rather than sending all fees to a separate trust, a portion of Jupiter’s revenue (which could be from swap fees, future platform fees, etc.) should flow back to those who stake and govern. This could be done by distributing a percentage of fees in USDC or other stable assets to stakers, or by the DAO using fee revenue to buy back $JUP and distribute it or burn it (increasing value for holders). The exact method can be debated, but the principle is to give $JUP holders a direct stake in the platform’s financial success. This “real yield” turns $JUP into a productive asset, not just a governance chip. It rewards long-term holders with income, thereby incentivizing loyalty and aligning everyone’s interests: if Jupiter does well, the community does well. Notably, the team has already committed 50% of fees to buying $JUP; under DAO control, those funds could be repurposed to fund a staker rewards program or otherwise benefit token holders, rather than just sitting idle. Such a move would show that Jupiter DAO is serious about making $JUP one of the great tokens in the ecosystem, with value backed by real activity.
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DAO-Proposed Governance Mechanisms & Independent Roadmap: The DAO should not be passively waiting for the team to improve governance processes – it should take the lead in crafting its own governance evolution. A counter-resolution would call for the formation of a DAO Governance Working Group (comprised of community-elected members) to research and propose improvements like those hinted at in the draft (e.g. new voting models, delegate systems, ways to better include smaller holders, etc.). These proposals should come from the community and be voted on by the community, ensuring that the governance framework itself is a product of decentralized decision-making. In addition, the DAO should develop a transparent roadmap of its own initiatives. This means identifying and planning projects that the DAO will undertake independently. For example, the DAO might plan hackathons, marketing campaigns, partnerships with other protocols, or even DAO-developed products that complement Jupiter’s ecosystem. Publishing a roadmap (just as the core team likely has its roadmap) will signal that the DAO is not just reacting to the team’s agenda, but setting an agenda of its own. This is critical for the DAO to mature into a governing force. By proposing and executing initiatives, the community will gain experience and confidence in self-governance. Importantly, these should be public and transparent plans, so that the wider community sees the DAO’s direction and can hold it accountable (just as the DAO holds grantees accountable via updates). Ultimately, this fosters a culture where the DAO isn’t waiting on the team’s next move; instead, the DAO becomes a source of innovation and action in parallel to the core development team.
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Continued Funding and Sustainability: Alongside converting the Litterbox Trust, the DAO should ensure its funding sources are open-ended and sustainable. Rather than halting the 50% fee allocation after two years, the community could push to make this (or some revenue-sharing scheme) permanent. The counter-resolution can include a clause that a portion of protocol revenues will continually feed the DAO treasury or reward pool beyond 2027, securing the DAO’s financial future. This way, the DAO isn’t just spending down a lump sum; it has ongoing income commensurate with Jupiter’s growth. Such a model is a true partnership: as Jupiter’s usage generates revenue, the DAO and its members benefit in real time, and those funds are reinvested into further growth or rewards, creating a virtuous cycle. It’s a far more tangible expression of “community ownership” than a one-time endowment.
Conclusion: From Supporter to Governor
In its present form, the “DAO Resolution Pt.1” draft asks the community to settle for a subordinate role and vague future promises. It contains lofty language about decentralization but stops short of delivering decentralization where it counts – in governance power and economic stake. This critical response has outlined how the draft falls short in empowering Jupiter DAO and $JUP holders, and offered a set of actionable changes as a remedy. These changes boil down to a simple principle: trust the community now, not later. Give the DAO the keys to its own treasury. Let token holders truly govern those resources. Make $JUP more than just a symbol by imbuing it with real utility and rewards. Encourage the DAO to set its own course and innovate.
By adopting such a counter-resolution, Jupiter DAO can transform from a well-intentioned experiment under training wheels into a robust, self-driven entity. This isn’t about rejecting the core team’s help – it’s about redefining the relationship. The team can remain a vital contributor and developer of the ecosystem, while the DAO becomes the rightful owner of the community treasury and a co-director of the project’s future. Both can work in synergy, but on a more equal footing, with the DAO holding the authority that a governance body deserves.
For long-term $JUP holders, these changes would finally provide the assurance that their faith and patience will be rewarded: the token they hold would have clear value streams and the community they’re part of would have real teeth in decision-making. For the Jupiter project as a whole, empowering the DAO is the path to long-term resilience. It spreads out leadership, aligns incentives across stakeholders, and turns users into invested owners.
It’s time to move beyond high-level philosophies and put real mechanisms in place. The next two years should not be about carefully guided pseudo-independence – they should be about actual decentralized governance taking root. Let’s make Jupiter DAO a pioneering example of a community that refused to be just a “supportive engine” and instead became a true governing force in the DeFi space. The community and the $JUP token deserve nothing less.
I’ve shared some of my own thoughts on how the DAO could move toward real autonomy, especially by rewarding long-term stakers and building sustainable yield mechanisms. Feel free to check out my proposal 
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