DAO pause and the new ASR structure

Jupiter DAO $JUP
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As we learned from today’s JUP rally that the DAO governance and voting has been suspended until the end of 2025.

While I do have some concerns about such a big decision being made behind closed doors, instead of through a DAO vote, I have some bigger concerns to share as well when it comes to the ASR rewards structure for the upcoming quarters; Q3 and Q4 of 2025.

Rewarding stakers based on their staking weight is fine, however, we would be diluting the heck out of the rewards by giving it to ALL stakers; regardless of them being inactive.

The rewards which would typically go to the active voters, would now be distributed amongst all the stakers, including the inactive ones (dead stakers, stakers with lost keys, airdrop hunters), further disadvantaging (or screwing) the most engaged members of the community.

  • Currently, total JUP tokens staked = ~672,000,000 (672 million)
  • Average number of votes per proposal in Q2 = ~532,000,000 (532 million)
  • ASR pot per quarter = 50,000,000 (50 million)

Scenario A (Current scenario where only the active stakers are rewarded):

50000000/532000000 ≈ 0.094 JUP in rewards per staked JUP.

Scenario B (Rewarding all stakers regardless of them being active):

50000000/672000000 ≈ 0.074 JUP in rewards per staked JUP.

If we reward all stakers regardless of activity, active stakers would receive significantly less—about 27% less—than under the current system.

As such, I urge the team to consider introducing dummy votes—possibly lighthearted or fun ones (e.g., favorite color, favorite team member, Iran or Israel, Slorg or Kash, etc.)—at random intervals each month. This would help distinguish active community members from passive ones.

I believe this could address many of the concerns that have been circulating on X and Discord since the announcement.

Let me know your thoughts—or if you have a better idea, I’m all ears.

Update: @LFGWHALE made a solid counter where we could do on-chain wallet check-ins in order to separate the active stakers from the inactive ones, which would eventually accomplish the same goals.

I am totally in favor of his idea, as opposed to my original one to do “fun” votes.

5 Likes
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My Thoughts on ASR Distribution During the DAO Pause

The 6‑month pause on DAO voting allows focus on execution, which is great—but the current ASR structure raises some important concerns:

:chart_decreasing: Dilution Risk
With ~672M JUP staked and only ~532M actually voting, rewarding all stakers reduces ASR value for active participants by about 27% (0.074 vs. 0.094 JUP per staked JUP) based on your figures.

:compass: Retaining Incentives
This means active voters get penalized while inactive “dead stakers” still pocket rewards. That undermines the very purpose of ASR, which is to reward engagement.

:white_check_mark: Potential Solutions
Minimum staking threshold (e.g., 10–20 JUP) to filter out dust and discourage sybil accounts—similar to practice for Q3 ASR eligibility

Dummy “fun” votes during the pause: even simple polls could help identify active wallets and align rewards accordingly—maintaining engagement without full DAO proposals.

:toolbox: Final Thoughts
Keep ASR active during the pause, but let’s refine its mechanics. Introducing thresholds or engagement markers ensures rewards remain meaningful and fairly distributed to those who actually participate.

2 Likes
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ASR is a rewards for participating in the DAO gouvernance.

We vote for the future of jup project, financement (and by option for our bags).

No vote so no interest to have ASR.

Team is giving you a present, accept it and don’t look numbers.

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Mods I have a proposal for the asr rewards for the rest of the year instead of only rewarding based on time-weight staking. Also include how many times a staking account has voted for more alligned rewarding. Bcs with the structure now many wallets that never voted will get eaqual amount of reward

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How is it the team that is giving the asr rewards when it is completely separate from the team’s $jup allocation?

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@LFGWHALE made a solid counter where we could do on-chain wallet check-ins in order to separate the active stakers from the inactive ones, which would eventually accomplish the same goals.

I am totally in favor of his idea, as opposed to my original one to do “fun” votes.

1 Like
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I really wish to see 50 or 100 Jup stake for at least 2 Month for threshold, rewarding everyone means less rewards for genuine participate.

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I hope team can also use wallet activeness or wallet products usage to determine activeness of wallet to duming wallet.

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If 100 million tokens are staked in inactive or possibly dead wallets that do not participate in governance, those wallets will still passively accumulate staking rewards (ASR). However, they must manually claim those rewards for them to be added to their staked position. the rewards will remain unclaimed indefinitely.

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It should be based on whoever voted in the most recent JUP and JUICE vote, those who stake new JUP, and those who opt in. I don’t think those who voted in the most recent JUP and JUICE vote should be forced to do meaningless pulse checks.

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This proposal introduces a new impact-weighted voting reward system. Instead of rewarding all voters equally, rewards should be allocated based on the actual success of the proposal voted on. This shifts incentives from passive participation to intentional, thoughtful governance.

The current reward structure promotes participation farming, not real decision-making.
People vote to receive rewards – not because they care about the outcome.
This results in:

  • Low-quality votes
  • Approval of non-strategic or low-value proposals
  • Passive stakers gaining equal share to engaged community members
  • No accountability or follow-up on the success of funded initiatives

The most engaged members – those who care, evaluate, and vote with intent – are disadvantaged.

Proposed Solution

Introduce a Vote-to-Earn (V2E) 2.0 mechanism:

  1. Success-Linked Rewards:
  • A vote is tracked after execution.
  • If the proposal generates measurable value (e.g., revenue, growth, KPIs), the voters who supported it receive proportional bonuses.
  • Value can be defined as revenue (on-chain), milestone completion, or on-chain engagement increases.
  1. On-Chain Success Metrics (if available):
  • For proposals tied to dApps, vaults, or ecosystem tools, connect rewards to on-chain metrics.
  • Examples: TVL growth, transaction volume, profit yield.
  1. Transparency Layer:
  • Every proposal gets a Success Dashboard (auto-updated or oracle-fed).
  • Track progress over 3-6-12 months.
  • Include KPIs and milestones in the proposal submission.
  1. Dead Stake Suppression:
  • Wallets inactive for X months or with lost keys don’t receive passive rewards.
  • Instead, they must either vote or delegate to stay eligible.

– Proposals must define measurable KPIs before the vote.
Votes are not judged on outcomes. A vote that creates $100k/year impact is rewarded the same as one that burns $100k.