DAO Resolution #2: Updating the Proposal Process Based on Feedback [DRAFT]

DAO Resolution #2: The Proposal Process

The Jupiter DAO was not born perfect. But the beauty of our DAO is our ability to take steps towards perfection with each proposal.

Today, we propose a draft of DAO Resolution #2, all about the proposal processes. Specifically, we want to revisit and solicit community feedback on 2 key dimensions: thresholds for the passing of votes and Work Group $JUP allocations.

While contained together in this post, each area would receive its own vote, so that voters can express opinions on each area individually.

DAO Resolution 2A: Voting Thresholds and “Abstain”

The power of a full DAO vote is to give a resounding social mandate to the proposal in question.

When done well, passed votes are unimpeachable indications of voter sentiment around a proposal. Ensuring that every “Passed” proposal is widely accepted as the will of the DAO is an important piece of legitimacy and credibility for DAO proposals.

Right now, DAO votes are passed by simple majority. But that can result in some cases where a rather large minority are unhappy with the decision of the rest of the DAO.

The principle here is that DAO votes should be widely agreed upon by a supermajority of the community. The DAO treasury and the Jupiverse as a whole are precious - they should be leveraged only when there is a very clear agreement to do so.

Consequently, we propose increasing the passing threshold to 65% for simple yes/no votes.

This would have the clear benefit of ensuring that the only things that the DAO executes on are things that have a broad base of support. Proposers would need to do more coalition-building, take into account more perspectives, and campaign more actively for their proposals. This is a net improvement to the state of the DAO.

But for this system to work, we need to remove Abstain as a default voting option.

On a principled level, “Abstain” goes against the core concept of Active Staking Rewards. ASR is given to those to give their opinion/perspective to the DAO - “Abstain” is not an opinion, but rather a lack of opinion.

On a practical level, Abstain is regularly getting 10-15% of votes on each proposal. This is diluting the social mandate of the DAO, and making it harder to understand how people actually feel. Further, from the perspective of a supermajority voting threshold, Abstain functions as a “No” vote, making it unnecessarily difficult for proposals to pass the supermajority.

Together, these two changes (increasing the voting threshold and removing abstain) will make the DAO’s social mandate substantially stronger while ensuring that the DAO has a clearer gauge of sentiment from its voters.

DAO Resolution 2B: Work Group $JUP Allocations

One of the most contentious parts of any Work Group vote is the $JUP allocation.

Many voters have reasonably said that the FUD arises from a lack of alignment and accountability. Because $JUP allocations are requested in advance of the work being completed, there is the potential for a Work Group to coast to the finish line of their term and receive their $JUP, regardless of how they performed.

While we have not seen this happen in practice, it is indeed a theoretical problem worth solving to future-proof the DAO.

The ideal system would instead only allocate $JUP at the end of the term, and should be tied to the scale of the impact the Work Group had towards the DAO’s mission of accelerating the growth of Jupiter’s products, community, and ideas.

The ideal system would have variable rewards, such that those who perform better receive more $JUP, and those who don’t receive less $JUP.

And the ideal system would have a clear and defined accountability vote for every Work Group.

For that reason, we propose 4 changes to the current Work Group structuring:

First, future Work Groups should be limited to 1 year term per proposal. Currently, WGs propose for a multi-year JUP allocation along a single year operating budget. If this proposal is passed, future WGs would only think in 1 year increments. They can, of course, propose a renewal, with a new operating budget for year 2.

Second, future WGs will not include $JUP in their initial budget proposals. Currently, they do. Future WGs would instead receive $JUP retroactively at the end of their 1 year term, based on their performance (more on this below).

Third, each WG would be required to include formalized Measures of Success in their proposal that directly relate to the DAO’s mission. Currently, there is a suggestion for WGs to include this information in their proposal under the recommended proposal guidelines. To enable flexibility, these Measures do not need to be specific milestones (e.g. 1m Views on Youtube). But it is important that each WG can articulate what specifically they are doing to help the DAO. Likely, this will be a small set of metrics (1-5), both qualitative and quantitative, that can be used to evaluate performance at the end of the 1 year term.

Finally, each WG will get a formal Performance Evaluation Vote at the end of their 1 year term. The DAO (or Representatives of the DAO, should they exist in the future) will vote on the size of the $JUP bonus, based on the Measures of Success the WG identified in their initial proposal.

None of these changes would apply to the previously approved Work Groups, since their conditions were set/approved at the time of their vote. These changes would purely be forward-looking.

Benefits of the $JUP Bonus System

We believe this system is better for Work Groups, for the DAO, and for Jupiter as a whole.

The Work Groups remove the #1 FUD vector from their proposals. As anyone who has experienced will tell you, going through the vote process is extremely difficult. Removing the primary point of contention will make life substantially easier for Work Group members.

The DAO benefits by having a clearer sense of accountability and ensuring that $JUP is going to those who have put in the work to earn it.

And Jupiter benefits by becoming more of a talent magnet. Currently, the FUD around $JUP allocations is preventing many talented folks from participating in the DAO. By creating a standardized system that enables talent (from both outside and inside the community) to have more predictability, we increase Jupiter’s growth potential.

Structuring of $JUP Bonuses

We propose that the $JUP bonuses should be allocated on a tiered basis, rather than decided for each WG individually. Doing the latter will again stir up FUD and resentment, just at a later date than the initial proposal.

Instead, we ought to create pre-defined tiers for $JUP allocations that apply to all Work Groups, regardless of their scope.

These tiers would be tied to the number of people in the WG itself.

Our initial suggestion (very much up for community discussion!) would be something like the following:

Tier 1 (Below Expectations): for WGs that have done substantially less than expected, the $JUP bonus pool will be 25,000 $JUP per member. This would be the bottom tier in order to ensure that all WG Members know that there is some JUP coming their way for the energy and effort they have put in.

Tier 2 (As Expected): for WGs that have done some good work, but not up to the initial expectation, the $JUP bonus pool will be 75,000 $JUP per fulltime Member.

Tier 3 (Above Expectations): For WGs that have done an adequate job, the $JUP bonus pool will be 100,000 $JUP per fulltime Member.

Tier 4 (Critical for DAO Success): For WGs that have crushed it, the $JUP bonus pool will be 150,000 $JUP per fulltime Member.

In all cases, the headcount would be determined by the size of the initial WG in the proposal. This creates a natural incentive not to bloat the WG over time and add more headcount just for the sake of it.

There are likely other ways to also determine how large the bonus pool should be (e.g. including part-time contributors, making it a flat amount irrespective of number of people in the WG, making it a % of operating budget, denominate it in $ terms defined at the beginning of the WG’s term rather than in raw $JUP for more predictability, etc) -would love to hear ideas in the comments below!

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*This is a draft proposal - to get to final form, we need your thoughts! Please drop your ideas, suggestions, and revisions down below. *

J4J.

81 Likes

A teired system as well as a vote makes a lot of sense.

This should hopefully address a lot of concern sregarding jup for WG’s

14 Likes

Finally, each WG will get a formal Performance Evaluation Vote at the end of their 1 year term. The DAO (or Representatives of the DAO, should they exist in the future) will vote on the size of the $JUP bonus, based on the Measures of Success the WG identified in their initial proposal.

This is much more better :green_heart::green_heart::green_heart:

6 Likes

Tier looks great as well…what metric do you think would be better to gauge their work? Let’s take for instance the Jup and juice, engagement? Podcast partnership?

3 Likes

Lets get rid of abstain or make it not count somehow . Maybe 69% and call it plan B instead… Make abstain not part of total vote calculations. LFG
Im ok with removing though. I think it might fud bots though as default

6 Likes

This would be more sustainable than giving out all the fuss. Niceee team

4 Likes

Very reasonable suggestions and changes. :+1:

Having milestone and metric based ideas would be cool, especially given the clearer mandate on the DAO side of things. At the same time I think, it’s also important that WG still have some room for experimentation and breakouts to achieve these DAO goals in creative/non-planned for ways. Web4 space is highly dynamic and requires constant adaptation to grow.

8 Likes

About $JUP allocations, looks more fair.
WG will have to work on real mesurable objectives.

About abstaining, it sure is useless and maybe it should not be taken into account into ASR as it does not bring any value.
let’s remove it as those who don’t want to take part can just not vote.

4 Likes

we really need this proposal.

Both 2A and 2B are very good. This will let us focus on the critical feedback we need from the community.

Small feedback from my side. I believe its better to allocate $JUP after a year to the whole team and not per member. The team should have the autonomy to distribute the allocation in the team.

4 Likes

Good to pivot when needs be! Both proposals are more effective and holds

A, DAO member more accountable on the votes in progress

B, The WGs to account on performance!

Lets run it!!!

4 Likes

Sounds pretty legit to me.

3 Likes

Whatever tall do, don’t go into yapping to reward members as low account believers will missout a lot.

2 Likes

I disagree about the abstain. Some proposals I do not have an opinion on and I am neutral in my position.

7 Likes

Then don’t vote ser, we need more people with an opinion one way or the other, not more people without opinions.

2 Likes

The initial $JUP might be the accelerant some work groups need. I’m saying this because WG’s aren’t just created everyday, it could be a negotiable area of becoming a WG. Present their need for the funds immediately > accept/deny the terms > move on to the yearly performance evaluation. Not for or against anything here, but shutting off a resource that could really benefit a WG and Jupiter as a whole might be unfortunate.

The principal of a yearly evaluation to obtain funds seems to be a solid solution for the majority of situations though :heart_hands:t3:

4 Likes

Hey team, thank you for this well-thought-out draft. I’d like to share a few thoughts and suggestions on both parts of the resolution.

:green_circle: On Resolution 2A (Voting Thresholds & Abstain Option):

I support increasing the threshold to 65% — it strengthens the legitimacy of each proposal and encourages more thorough coalition-building.

That said, I’d suggest keeping the “Abstain” option but removing it from ASR eligibility. Some voters may still want to signal participation without endorsing a clear “Yes” or “No”. Removing ASR rewards for Abstain votes could reduce misuse while respecting voter freedom.

:green_circle: On Resolution 2B (WG $JUP Allocations):

The shift to performance-based $JUP bonuses is a smart move. It aligns better with DAO values and helps remove the biggest FUD vector: upfront rewards.

Here are a few ideas that might help refine the model:
• Add a “Community Feedback Score” as part of the evaluation, to let the wider DAO rate how the WG interacted with the community.
• Consider bonus weight adjustments for part-time contributors, or a base + variable model depending on their impact.
• Include more transparency about what “Tier” looks like in practice: maybe an open dashboard tracking progress toward each WG’s Measures of Success throughout the year.

I’m excited to see this process evolve. Keep building — this is exactly what makes Jupiter’s DAO structure powerful.

J4J :rocket:

3 Likes

A very good idea to exclude the option of abstaining from voting.
This will allow more involvement of Jupiter stakers in the processes of DAO. I also agree with the proposals regarding the evaluation of the work of working groups and their monetary motivation.

2 Likes

On 2A…I feel this is a well thought out and balanced approach…seems very fair to have an increase in the voting threshold and remove abstain as I feel we need more input from voters in that a “yes” or “no” vote gives absolute direction.

On 2B…I feel that performance based tiered rewards are the way to go 100% This feels more like the WG will be aligned better to outperform and having that performance go to vote will allow the community to decide on the said rewards the team gets…well done!!

2 Likes

You can leave “abstain”, but don’t include it in the final calculation of vote percentages.

3 Likes

I am happy to see this draft. Good thinking. I like taking abstaining from vote off the table. See no reason to include people with no opinions on the vote. Now, thinking of members getting paid, you have everyone in a group receiving the same amount. Not everyone will be equal in their work. I laughed when I read where even under performers get rewarded quite well. I really like the draft and am all for it.

2 Likes