May the best resolution proposal WIN.
3 Likes
I agree with both proposal, they are sounds fair to me!
2 Likes
A lot of good points and solutions in this proposal. Itās a great step in the right direction. Getting rid of abstain is a great value add IMO, we need more active participation, and abstain is a way to avoid that. It also makes sense that an increased vote pass threshold would be associated with the absence of the abstain option.
I think some increased explanation and context would be helpful for the $JUP tiers. What defines a Full-time member? Is the current language suggesting the bonus pool for the group can be split up differently than what is allocated per person? If so, how is that decided? I also think a higher standard than āadequateā makes sense for the 2nd highest tier. In this scenario, part-time contributors would get 0 $JUP allocated to them?
Also, I would have a concern that if the DAO is voting on the $JUP allocation tiers, how will that be structured? List out all of the options to vote on? Majority wins? And since they would be voted on at the end of the process, the $JUP price might have an implicit or explicit bias on determining the bonus amount, compared to the intended goal of judging on merit. Just something to consider.
2 Likes
I want to kickstart a public discussion on abstain, just because I Know prior conversations around it were a bit divisive.
Some people like abstain as they genuinely do not feel strongly either way. In some ways it can also be seen as a protest vote by āopting outā. Although it could be a net benefit removing it entirely, as some advocate for ā there is certainly another group of individuals who truly want to keep it.
9 Likes
I donāt agree that abstaining is necessarily a lack of opinion. It can also represent an indifference to the two options suggesting that either path is reasonable. However, I do believe that if people are consistently and only choosing to abstain, then that is in effect diluting the mandate.
Is there any data on voting patterns? I am probably just as concerned about stakers who blindly vote in a direction as much as Iād be about abstaining.
5 Likes
Anything that reduces the jup dilution is good for the regular jup users/staker
2 Likes
I really like this proposal. I wasnāt against the team funding WG but I always thought that this was a little vague, now, with all these criterias it will make more sense and I think it will end all the FUD that all those votes caused. For WG there is nothing to worry about, if they make a good job, they will get their JUP Bonus.. this is a great motivation!
I also like the 65% majority to pass, I never understood why we had the abstain, I think most of people (not all) that voted abstain were people that didnāt mind reading the proposalā¦
JUP IS HOME!!!
2 Likes
Why would Tier 1 performers get anything at all? Forget energy and effort. We need to see results and impact. If the delivery has been below expectations then no JUP should be given.
5 Likes
150,000 JUP per annum is wild, even for top performers in DAO WGās. If Meow is to be believed, 150,000 will be worth $750,000 in a few years time. Why oh why does anyone deserve that level of annual performance related bonus for banging a drum ? Deary me, we really have drank the kool-aid havenāt we!
3 Likes
Sensible proposals. For WGās, should they get a portion up front? 1/3 or so? Iām admittedly ignorant of the WGās normal process, so this may be moot. Just know some devs need to pay bills.
1 Like
This is a great idea. For some special proposals, we could even include two votes: one to decide the percentage of acceptance required to pass the proposal, and another to vote on the proposal itself.
Also, weāre fiiiiinally taking results into consideration ā thatās the difference between a serious, profitable community and a group of happy kids with magical internet money. Please more results based prices. Pleaseeeeeeeee.
2 Likes
Thanks for putting this together ā both proposals represent meaningful steps toward a stronger DAO. After reviewing both, I believe Resolution 2B (Work Group $JUP Allocations) is the more impactful and urgently needed change.
Why?
- It directly addresses one of the main sources of friction and FUD: pre-approved compensation without clear accountability.
- It aligns incentives with delivery ā a must if we want the DAO to attract top contributors and maintain legitimacy.
- The retroactive, performance-based bonus model introduces fairness, transparency, and removes negotiation overhead from the initial proposal process.
A few thoughts for refinement:
- Bonus tiers should consider not just headcount but also the strategic weight and operating budget of the Work Group.
- Pegging the bonus to a USD-equivalent at the start of the term might help mitigate volatility and expectation mismatches.
Overall, 2B feels like the right kind of evolution: meritocratic, measurable, and aligned with long-term sustainability.
Looking forward to the final version.
4 Likes
2A - Remove the Abstain option and I propose making the voting window longer than 4 - 5 days. Sometimes people are unavailable to be able to participate in the vote during these short voting windows. Perhaps a 7 - 14 day voting window would allow more people to vote?
There also needs to be some criteria around the 65% passing threshold. Such as a 75% minimum of the allowed voters participate in the vote or voting power; then 65% threshold of yes votes would win.
2B - Merit based bonus is definitely the way to go. This could be very complex or simple depending on the project itself.
For a big project, perhaps milestone reviews could be done and maybe 25% of tier 3 or 4 is paid out at the conclusion of each milestone with the rest being paid on a vesting schedule once the project is completed over a year or two. Milestone reviews could help show the DAO how a project is coming along.
4 Likes
genuinely believe that the working groups are having a negative impact. The Jupiter community is large, and most of us including myself donāt clearly understand the purpose or value of these groups. A lot of the FUD surrounding Jupiter seems to stem from this confusion. Itās hard to justify the high salaries being allocated when weāre not seeing any clear improvements on the contrary, things seem to be getting worse. Therefore, regardless of the proposals being made, I believe that working groups are a fundamentally bad idea. Of course, this is just my personal opinion.
2 Likes
IMO, anybody who follows Jupiter governance will always vote instead of giving up potential rewards from ASR, regardless of how good/dumb a proposal is and if they have an opinion or not.
4 Likes
- Skip abstain, 75% treshold would be bettter;
- Always make an evaluation after ONE year, be transparant about the results achieved. Keep on navigating, make it as transparant as possible, then more members will be motivated to be a part of the active community.
Keep up the good work.
1 Like
People who abstain, shouldnāt be counted in whether or not the vote passes.
Abstain should be treated equally as yes or no. It should be treated as voted, but not count for either side. Itās not a no, or a yes.
If I donāt understand a proposal, Iāll research it. But when I vote, am I making the right choice for the project? Sometimes Iām not sure. Iām not as studied up as the folks who are way more invested in this project. Pretty sure my vote carries little weight anyway, Iāve less than 1000 JUP.
My vote matters, but if I canāt decide? My vote isnāt a NO. Itās letting the people smarter than me, make the decision.
4 Likes
I love it. Both the changes are designed towards the longevity of JUP and its investors.
WGs must be held accountable!
I will be voting FOR it. Great work gathering and implementing feedback @Kash @meow
1 Like
Hmmmā¦I like this one. Iāll have to read it again with fresh eyes tomorrow.
1 Like
Raising the threshold to 65% is a solid improvement ā it ensures that passed proposals are broadly supported and encourages stronger community alignment.
That said, I have a different take on removing āAbstain.ā While I agree that passive abstention can dilute results, completely removing the option might force uninformed voters to make a binary decision just to qualify for rewards ā which can reduce vote quality.
Suggestion: Keep āAbstainā but require voters who select it to provide a compulsory short explanation (via a text box or dropdown reasons). This adds intentionality to abstaining and gives proposal authors better feedback on whatās missing ā whether itās unclear scope, lack of trust, insufficient data, etc.
This way, āAbstainā becomes a constructive choice rather than a passive one.
2 Likes