DAO Resolution #2: Updating the Proposal Process Based on Feedback [DRAFT]

[lochie2001]

@Kash

Consequently, we propose increasing the passing threshold to 65% for simple yes/no votes.

Considering all but one WG vote has gone beyond 65% (uplink) I think 65% is too high

I think l 55-60% is a strong majority.

Otherwise no WG votes will pass it seems.

[lochie2001]

Having abstain shows people aren’t here for the future, rather the asr

If you want to be rewarded with asr your vote matters, and abstains just split votes I feel

[Slorg]

Is that true in every case though?

[mummyninja]

Looks good. I like this prop!

[Alunique]

I like to be involved and I certainly have opinions but there was at 1 proposal that I did not understand enough to make an informed decision. Abstaining was a better option than a forced choice for me. If someone only abstains from every vote, that is different, but a “do no harm” vote is still better than a bot blindly voting “yes” to everything. As others have suggested, just don’t tally the abstain votes when calculating the percentage of “yes” votes.

[Rida28]

Loving the direction here , boosting the voting threshold and scrapping “Abstain” sharpens the DAO’s voice, while performance-based $JUP rewards bring real accountability. Clean, fair, and future-ready . This is how you level up a DAO.

[SuperDan]

I agree with the 65% approval rating, minus abstentions, and I would like to propose increasing the amount of the reward to more than 50 million per quarter, while maintaining the reward balance with the number of staking such as
Staking 500M reward 50M per Q, 10% yield
Staking 600M reward 60M per Q, 10% yield
Staking 700M reward 70M per Q, 10% yield
Staking 800M reward 80M per Q, 10% yield
Super Dan

[guapx]

Yep, measuring WG outcomes against explicit DAO agendas is a good move forward. Clearly defining performance goals is the job of the DAO and the clearly performing against those goals is the jobs of the WGs - this is a reasonable ‘circularity’ as both sides of the ‘goal’ are incentivised to produce good outcomes - which the broader community can see and ‘move on’ as needed.

[rtahira27]

This is the way! LFG!

[DCansino]

Yes Go for it! Looks great!

[JD-SOL84]

Hello Kash.

Abstain Option:

Regarding the “abstain” option during a vote. I do agree with your assessment of the perception of lack of participation.
While, I believe some voters may partially agreed with the proposal, it may not be enough for them to cast a “for it” vote. However, the discussion channels, townhalls, and AMAs, offer a practical tool to help refined these proposals before going into a vote.

Therefore, active feedback and continues improvement, are key to eliminate the “abstain” option.

In conclusion, even if there are members who still don’t fully agreed after feedback has been implemented, they can always vote “against it” instead and proceed to provide feedback with their vote.

Passing Vote Treshold:

Implementing a threshold of 65% as the supermajority for a vote to pass, could have a better outcome if raised to 70% instead. This passing threshold of 70% (a well rounded up number) may play a psychological factor of further alignment. (IMHO).

DAO Resolution, $JUP Allocation:

I personally don’t oppose the current system. However, I believe the tier system could help alleviate some of the DAO concerns.

If a future working group underperform the $USDC allocation along, should be enough incentive for the WG energy and efforts without further compensation of $JUP, I believe this would also address majority of concerns of the DAO.

Consequently, if the $JUP allocation is to be distributed at the end of the year from when the vote passed. A goon measure of success could be measure on a quarterly evaluation using KPIs.

Identify key performance indicators, allow to set metrics and expectations. Each key performance could be considered on individual success of each established metric (member and WG objective) in accordance with the WG initial proposal.

[martinratinaud]

Definitely agree with that

[vegtrader]

On what planet do regular day jobs get these size bonuses?
Tie the tiers to token price and the impact the working group has on it, which is really what every holder gets benefit from at the end of the day. Not pie in the sky ideals.

[vsemmetall]

Looks good. I like this proposal

[stone]

abstain is useful for when

1. (i) don’t understand the implications of a proposal fully OR
2. don’t have strong opinion either way and i don’t want to impact the decision negatively or positively

[HardMoneyMaker]

sounds great to me, I like this proposal

[scorcot]

In my opinion, voting on the size and accrual of the $JUP bonus based on the success metrics identified by the working group in its initial proposal is a good idea.

[NFTICHIE]

@Kash

Together, these two changes (increasing the voting threshold and removing abstain) will make the DAO’s social mandate substantially stronger while ensuring that the DAO has a clearer gauge of sentiment from its voters.

DAO Resolution 2B: Wo

We’ve tried the voting threshold method before, but it doesn’t hurt to give it another shot. REMOVING ABSTAIN is a solid one. I misuse it a lot when my thoughts are divided, and that’s just me exhibiting laziness towards my DAO responsibilities. I should work harder for my ASR.

@Kash

For that reason, we propose 4 changes to the current Work Group structuring:

First, future Work Groups should be limited to 1 year term per proposal. Currently, WGs propose for a multi-year JUP allocation along a single year operating budget. If this proposal is passed, future WGs would only think in 1 year increments. They can, of course, propose a renewal, with a new operating budget for year 2.

Second, future WGs will not include $JUP in their initial budget proposals. Currently, they do. Future WGs would instead receive $JUP retroactively at the end of their 1 year term, based on their performance (more on this below).

Third, each WG would be required to include formalized Measures of Success in their proposal that directly relate to the DAO’s mission. Currently, there is a suggestion for WGs to include this information in their proposal under the recommended proposal guidelines. To enable flexibility, these Measures do not need to be specific milestones (e.g. 1m Views on Youtube). But it is important that each WG can articulate what specifically they are doing to help the DAO. Likely, this will be a small set of metrics (1-5), both qualitative and quantitative, that can be used to evaluate performance at the end of the 1 year term.

Finally, each WG will get a formal Performance Evaluation Vote at the end of their 1 year term. The DAO (or Representatives of the DAO, should they exist in the future) will vote on the size of the $JUP bonus, based on the Measures of Success the WG identified in their initial proposal.

1. Really won’t make a difference IMO.
2. I completely agree with excluding $JUP from their contract because that seems to be the root fuel for the panic and fud coming from stakers.
3. They already have their proof of work in their proposals, but that doesn’t seem to make any difference in the eyes of concerned stakeholders.
4. The formal performance evaluation should be done quarterly on the planetary calls, and here in the discussion. This will enable the DAO to have the freedom to scrutinize and better understand the WG’s progress.

@Kash

We propose that the $JUP bonuses should be allocated on a tiered basis, rather than decided for each WG individually. Doing the latter will again stir up FUD and resentment, just at a later date than the initial proposal.

Instead, we ought to create pre-defined tiers for $JUP allocations that apply to all Work Groups, regardless of their scope.

These tiers would be tied to the number of people in the WG itself.

Our initial suggestion (very much up for community discussion!) would be something like the following:

Tier 1 (Below Expectations): for WGs that have done substantially less than expected, the $JUP bonus pool will be 25,000 $JUP per member. This would be the bottom tier in order to ensure that all WG Members know that there is some JUP coming their way for the energy and effort they have put in.

Tier 2 (As Expected): for WGs that have done some good work, but not up to the initial expectation, the $JUP bonus pool will be 75,000 $JUP per fulltime Member.

Tier 3 (Above Expectations): For WGs that have done an adequate job, the $JUP bonus pool will be 100,000 $JUP per full-time Member.

Tier 4 (Critical for DAO Success): For WGs that have crushed it, the $JUP bonus pool will be 150,000 $JUP per full-time Member.

The tier system idea is perfect, but the amounts to be paid seem outrageous, don’t you think? They are already being paid salaries in USDC, and this is supposed to be a bonus. This is exactly why fud started in the first place, the amounts of JUP they are to receive are way too much for the job at hand (at least that’s what I’ve been hearing). So lower the bonus a lot so it looks like a bonus fam not the salary itself.

My conclusion and personal take on all of this is that the WGs should first convince the DAO that it’s even relevant to have them. I personally love DEVREL and JUP & JUICE because I see their relevance, so I really won’t have much to complain about when they are allocated a fat bag (especially DEVREL ). But when the DAO doesn’t believe in the team’s mission and work, it makes it difficult for the DAO to swallow the expenses attached to the mission.

1. Keep $JUP payment on a long pause for now
2. Let the DAO do the scrutinizing and performance evaluation(we are the users, not the team).
3. WGs should only do what benefits the DAO and $JUP as a token, completely visible benefits.

[zippy1979]

Proposal looks sound, I would like to see this happen

[Chrisdprof1]

Wow this is awesome let’s ride it