DAO Resolution #2: Updating the Proposal Process Based on Feedback [DRAFT]

let’s move on, I like this proposal

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This is a reasonable proposal to make sure the opinions of the majority really carries weight. 65% passing threshold is much better than previous setting. I would vote for YES!

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yes delete abstain- no idea/opinion no vote
wg bonuses - well seems ok based on jup @ 0,5 what if we move finally and target US$ 2.- to 3.-

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The tiered system would be great especially to ensure everyone gets rewarded based on the work they have put in. But what will be the metrics for measuring?

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I’ve advocated for its removal of abstain from the start, it shows a lack of dedication and poor decision-making, which is why it’s up for a community vote.

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I’d argue the majority of resistance to the removal of abstain function is due to the dilemma of not qualifying for ASR it would present. Because if realised (abstain removed), the only way to do so going forward (abstain), would be to not cast a vote; thereby losing ASR portion.

A solution I’ve been thinking about for a while and the next big step in the DAO’s evolution comes from simply making the A in ASR mean Automatic, not Active.

Also while we’re at it let’s add a note on the governance page that “good cat” allocations will never be considered for DAO participation.

Take a moment to think how impactful these two changes would be for the DAO. :handshake:

(Should also put I agree with every proposed change and think they’re necessary - great start.)

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Yes, really big on removing that abstain option

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It seems to me that such an approach is a serious step towards efficiency. I see only one risk in it (I don’t think it will be implemented, but as an element of analysis) - the size of motivation tied directly to a member of the working group can motivate the working group to overstate the number of required members of the initial working group. For example, 5 members of the working group are required to solve problems, but 7 are declared in the initial working group.

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Retroactive $JUP tied to performance is a major win. It shifts incentives toward outcomes, not entitlement.
Would suggest refining tier definitions and building in peer + stakeholder feedback loops during the term to avoid all-or-nothing judgments at the end

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Lets go … I am voting YES on this one :partying_face: :smiling_face_with_sunglasses:

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Feedback on Reward structure:

I think Instead of just JUP. The WKG should receive a proportonal seasanol basket of top perfoming assets at JUP Dex or Have at least to option to reedeem that way

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The whole proposal is such a good point,
2a seems legit, Abstain = no vote, so if you can’t decide if you are for or against something you don’t need to vote.
2b is what we really need to improve the dao, i love every aspect proposed, and i think this will give a really good boost on the work by the WGs.

I love jup, i love the Dao and i love this community! Let’s Fucking GOOOO

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here’s the thing, if someone doesn’t want to vote yes, then they might have reasons as to why they are against the proposal. Why not just reach out to the WG members, have discussion with them, resolve any misunderstandings or confusion, give feedback to them and if you are satisfied with the outcome, you vote in favor of the proposal, if you are not happy with the talk, vote against it. This is how a governance should work in my opinion and the option of abstain ruins it.

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Agree with both proposals in principle.

In regards to Proposal 2B: WG JUP allocations - Its great to finally see some performance metrics being required.

However, assuming teams will still be receiving a salary as part of their initial budget, then if a WG performs below expectations, why would they receive any performance bonus at all? Its no wonder there is so much concern in the community about bonus JUP allocations when this is the default suggestion of the team. If WG members want “some JUP coming their way for the energy and effort they have put in”, they are already being paid a salary for their energy and effort and they can spend some of that to buy some. Receiving a performance bonus should not be the default, it should be reserved for over achievers, where performance is above and beyond expectations.

Even when performance is above and beyond expectations, a bonus should not be the equivilient of a second salary (or higher than their salary in some previous WG proposals!). 150k JUP is a crazy amount. Especially if this is going to be a flat rate applied to all working groups, regardless of their relevance or strategic importance.

The WG members, and everyone else here reading this proposal, should truely believe in the Jupiter vision. If we want to create long term “alignment” when providing a JUP allocation as a bonus, then it should be based on the long term value of the token, not its current value.
If we imagine that JUP price could go up to $5 in the next 5 years, then I would have thought the cap on the highest tier should be around 25k JUP (a $100k USD future equivlient, if they stay “aligned” for 5 years. Remember, the purpose of these tokens is for long term alignment, not to be sold to pay they bills. They already get a salary for that).

Because I feel like that might be a tough ask against the current suggestion, a more realistic cap to the highest tier might be around the 50k-75k mark.

Also, applying the bonus equally to all members of the workgroup might not be appropriate. I would suggest it might be better leaving it up to the members themselves to determine how the amount is split up.

Really though, I dont think a flat rate for performance bonuses across all WG works very well. There is too much variablity in the work done by the different, and potential future, working groups.

A potential alternative approach would be to base the tiers on how impactful the work of the WG is towards the growth of the DAO. The community could design a set of metrics based on what the community thinks is most important to the DAO, and each group is then assigned a teir based on how aligned they are to goals of the DAO and how much impact they have actually had on those core critical metrics. The more aligned they are, the higher their tier and potential bonus.

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Removing abstain option at least removes some of the incentive to vote without reading anything or caring at all.

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Abstain is normally an important part of a democracy. There may be reasons to neither vote yes or no on a proposal, so I would recommend that abstain is kept, but NOT COUNTED as a no vote.

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This is well thought, I’m a new user so I don’t have much suggestions to make.

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[quote=“zippy1979, post:60, topic:38661”]
soh
Oh wow, can’t wait to see the " Abstain " option chopped out of the Dao vote, there’s no sitting on the fence guys, it’s either yes or No …

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I stand by my opinion that governance should be active (it’s called Active Staking Rewards y’all), not passive! I’d rather see us all dive into discussions with WG members, clear up any confusion, and vote a clear “FOR” or “AGAINST” after giving feedback and having a back and forth. Abstaining just dilutes our power—let’s make our voices heard and shape the future together! I can understand genuine as to what if someone doesn’t have time for that for one of the votes, it’s unfair for them to miss out on ASR, but come on, I don’t want to sound anti-PPP, but I think it’s completely fair. This isn’t about farming ASR, this about making your vote count If you can’t make time for it, I guess there are better alternatives which have simple staking rewards as compared to the system JUPDAO has.

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would be fair.. I’m with you ..same idea, tks!

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