This article walks-through how we could structure more modular, transparent DAO proposals in the future. I’m using the current Jup & Juice proposal as an example — not because I expect it to change, but because it’s a useful case study. These kinds of proposals are going to keep coming, and it’s worth thinking about how we handle them going forward.
The Problem With One-Size-Fits-All Voting
Right now, many proposals ask voters to decide on everything in one go:
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Should we approve the team?
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Should we fund them for a year?
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Should we also give them a token bonus?
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Should we assume they’ll hit their goals?
But those are separate questions. Bundling them into a single vote forces people to either say yes to things they might not agree with — or reject a proposal they mostly support just to block a piece they don’t.
That kind of structure makes voting frustrating and limits trust in the process.
A Tiered Model: What It Could Look Like
This model breaks proposals into separate parts, each voted on individually. Some parts are conditional on others passing — so there’s structure, but also flexibility.
Everything would still be voted on during the same proposal cycle. Voters would see all four parts — working group approval, budget, bonus, and KPIs — laid out at once, and would cast separate votes on each. The difference is that each section stands on its own and only takes effect if the parts it depends on are approved. So while the voting happens at the same time, the outcomes are conditional, not bundled.
Let’s take the JUP & Juice proposal as a real-world example of how it could work.
Part A: Should JUP & Juice become a Core Working Group?
This is the foundational vote. If it doesn’t pass, the rest of the proposal doesn’t move forward.
Vote: Yes / No / Abstain Threshold: X majority of staked
If rejected: No budget, no bonus — the proposal ends here.
Part B: Should the DAO approve a $282,000 USDC budget?
Only considered if Part A passes. Breakdown:
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$246K to team compensation
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$36K to operations and tools
This gives voters a chance to support the WG while still having a say on how much they’re funded.
Part C: Should the DAO approve a 355K
Only considered if both A and B pass.
This is where alignment of incentives come in.
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Tokens are held in a DAO-controlled wallet
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Locked for 12 months
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Only released if the team meets clear performance targets
Part D: Should we approve the KPI framework for releasing the bonus?
If the DAO wants to grant a bonus, it also needs to define the expectations.
Sample KPIs could include:
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10M verified video impressions
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15 ecosystem partnerships
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Strong engagement + community growth
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Monthly transparency reports
Structure:
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50% of tokens can unlock at 6 months
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50% at 12 months
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DAO votes at each checkpoint to approve or deny release
If goals aren’t met, the tokens unlock back to the DAO treasury.
Voting Experience
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All four parts appear in a single proposal interface
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Voters cast Yes, No, or Abstain for each part
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Abstain = neutral (counts for ASR but not outcome)
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Skipping a part = no vote, no reward
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Voting power = staked, just like today
Why This Model Works Better
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Voters get more control — and more clarity
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Teams get clear direction from the DAO
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The DAO keeps incentives tied to actual results
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Bonus tokens don’t move unless the work gets done
This isn’t about making things more complicated — it’s about aligning incentives and giving people real options when they vote.
– LFG Whale