Ah true. My concern is that setting this figure at a nominal or % basis will mean a consistent failure to pass quorum; eventually, if not immediately. The data in the first image suggests this if we go with the proposed 30%.
I’ve suggested a solution. Basically an ASR qualification based on Participation % against number Total # of Proposals.
This incentivizes participation and would mitigate against the risk of quorum failure.
My fear is that setting this figure at a nominal or % basis will mean a consistent failure to pass quorum; eventually, if not immediately. The data in the first image suggests this if we go with the proposed 30%.
I’ve suggested a solution. Basically an ASR qualification based on Participation % against number Total # of Proposals.
This incentivizes participation and would mitigate against the risk of quorum failure.
Easy to achieve this proposal 
If Quorum % continues to decline, then the DAO risks a failure of the voting process.
This could be mitigated by implementing a requirement for users to participate in governance; a quorum of x % participation of all Proposals.
Bob never votes. He has not reached quorum to receive ASR.
Bob is now incentized to Vote, or Reduce Stake.
This works to ensure a successful Quorum for each proposal.
My mitigation solution is three fold. Essentially I’m saying to qualify ASR Rewards to only those wallets who achieve a certain % of Voting Participation. Then include % quorum to pass a vote, as the proposal offers. This does three things:
We should VOTE NO on this proposal and produce a new one with the amendments.
I think the last vote is pointless, because you will always get 100% success as long as you incentivize with rewards and as long as the changes are submitted to the vote by team members, not by people. On the other hand, you could make not a threshold for voting, but a threshold for agreeing or disagreeing (First, a vote for accepting the topic for voting, and if the threshold is passed, then a vote on the topic.) by several metrics:
as far as I know, these statistics can be collected, and then figure out how to create a coefficient for accepting a vote
Great , 30 % is good , could also be a % threeshold different considering some more or less community involving need kind of votes
30% stacked sounds good!
I vote for option 2. It seems to be a good option.
Think higher than 30% to offset any outsized power held by large accounts. Realistically, to better represent the entire population, we would need to introduce some additional logic to cover nuance. Wallet address count should be factored in at least.
I agree with you. Earlier I stated that percentage makes sense and your point for a majority is very sensible.
like @OrangoRosa proposal - percentage of the total rights!!!
I think it’s perfect for our DAO, send it brother!
Can you elaborate on quorum failure?
I think the best is 30% because the fluctuation of staking don’t interfere. In the other case we have to update at each time of fluctuation with another vote
why aren’t you requiring a higher percentage of staked JUP than 30%? It seems so low. In my mind quorum should be a metric to engage leadership, not the community. If you set the level higher it forces leadership to keep engagement higher in order to keep votes moving along.
I’m in favour of the percentage over a set limit. It’s more flexible and reflects the focus on the staked JUP itself. In the future it might be you want a lower/higher rate of staking so the threshold should move with that.
The 30% of staked Jup is Quorum for me.
Nice !!! JUP is the best token in SOL
I think that a certain percentage is the right way to go. I have no idea if 30% is the right percentage for the long haul ahead.
Everyone seems to be in favor of Increasing this number as its reasons are pretty clear. I do think that revisiting this Topic multiple times is overkill and think we could “as they say” kill 2 birds with 1 stone and vote for 30% active stake, Or in my opinion maybe 36%+
J4J
PPP
GOD BLESS
I vote for 120 mil
There is a risk on 30% choice . ( When in bear market and stake decrease )